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SYMPOSIUM REMARKS
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist *
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Judge Wilkinson.1 This afternoon, I am delighted to
participate in the University of Richmond School of Law's Sympo-
sium on Judicial Independence. This symposium is being held in
honor of Chief Justice Harry Carrico who has served forty-two
years on the Supreme Court of Virginia, twenty-two of those
years as the Chief Justice. I am pleased to join all of you on this
occasion in recognizing his long and distinguished career on the
bench.
Judicial independence is one of the touchstones of our constitu-
tional system of government. I like to think that the belief in the
wisdom of an independent judiciary is not confined to judges
alone, but is shared by other members of the legal profession and
by the public at large. It is easy today to see the need for an inde-
pendent judiciary, with the authority to enforce the terms of a
written constitution, but back in 1787, when the Founding Fa-
thers were drafting our Constitution, it was an entirely novel
concept. I believe that the creation of an independent constitu-
tional court, with the authority to declare unconstitutional laws
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. B.A., 1948, Stanford University;
M.A., 1948, Stanford University; M.A., 1949, Harvard University; LL.B., 1952, Stanford
Law School.
1. The Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III is a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wilkinson served as Chief Judge of the Fourth Cir-
cuit from 1996 to 2003.
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passed by the state or federal legislatures, is probably the most
significant single contribution the United States has made to the
art of government.
II. THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE VERSUS THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
The importance of judicial independence is illustrated very
well by looking at our experience with the Bill of Rights2 and the
French experience with the Declaration of the Rights of a Man,
and a Citizen ("French Declaration of Rights").3 The Bill of Rights
was ratified in 1791;' the French Declaration of Rights two years
earlier in 1789.' In comparing the language of the French Decla-
ration of Rights with the Bill of Rights of the United States Con-
stitution one would have said that while there were certainly
some differences, the basic guarantees provided by each were
pretty much the same. But when we turn from the catalogue of
rights contained in the French Declaration of Rights to what ac-
tually happened in France in the few years following 1789, we
find a dramatic difference between theory and practice.
Within only a few years of the adoption of the French Declara-
tion of Rights, a regime known as the "Reign of Terror" began.
During this period of time, three hundred thousand persons were
imprisoned, about twenty thousand people went to their deaths
on the guillotine, and another twenty thousand died in the pris-
ons or were executed without any trial.6 One historian of the
French Revolution has described the Reign of Terror as "judicial
murder." A Revolutionary Tribunal was created to try any "politi-
cal offense."7 According to one scholar, the Revolutionary Tribu-
nal "functioned like a court martial, inflicting only one penalty,
death, with no recourse possible against its sentence." Little at-
tention was given to the separation of the judicial authority from
the legislative and executive powers. The chief legislative body
2. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
3. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF A MAN, AND A CITIZEN (Fr. 1789).
4. H.R. Doc. NO. 100-94, at 13 n.ll (1987).
5. WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 118 (1989).
6. DONALD GREER, THE INCIDENCE OF THE TERROR DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
25-29 (1966).
7. Id. at 13-20.
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was the National Convention; the Convention created the Revolu-
tionary Tribunal, and during its brief existence frequently altered
the size and composition of this tribunal to suit political ends.'
Judges and jurors on the tribunal were appointed and removed by
the Convention. The Convention wrote the laws, frequently initi-
ated the prosecutions, and effectively controlled the Courts. 10
Trials in France proceeded with inordinate haste. There are
examples of a suspect being arrested early in the morning,
charged at nine o'clock a.m., tried at ten o'clock a.m., condemned
at noon, and guillotined at four o'clock p.m. When even the Revo-
lutionary Tribunal was perceived as being too slow and deliberate
to do the job, a decree was passed providing that after a trial had
lasted a certain period of time, jurors could interrupt and an-
nounce their verdict even though all the evidence had not been
received.11 Another law was adopted forbidding accused persons
from speaking in their own defense when to do so would entail
unnecessary delay or "obstruction of justice." 2
All of this happened in a country which only a few years before
had adopted the Declaration of the Rights of a Man, and a Citi-
zen. It seems to me that the reason it happened was that during
the Reign of Terror there was no independent institution that
could actually uphold the rights contained in the French Declara-
tion of Rights-the legislature was supreme; it promulgated the
laws, it authorized the prosecutions, and it controlled the courts.
It really didn't make any difference that all of the fine sentiments
contained in the French Declaration of Rights were still formally
in effect, because there was no independent organ of government
in France at the time which could stand up and enforce them on
behalf of the individual.
In contrast to the French experience, the American scheme in-
cluded an independent Judiciary, separate from the Legislature
and the Executive, and with the power of judicial review. Article
III of our Constitution confers upon the judiciary life-long tenure
8. See 33 JAMES LOGAN GODFREY, REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE: A STUDY OF THE
ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, AND PROCEDURE OF THE PARIS TRIBUNAL, 1793-1795, at 54-
60(1951).
9. See id. at 54-55.
10. See id. at 54-60.
11. See id. at 128.
12. See id. at 132.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
during good behavior, and contains a prohibition against diminu-
tion of compensation while in office.' 3 Article III judges can only
be removed from office through the mechanism of impeachment. 4
Having the security of their positions and their salaries goes a
long way toward ensuring judges' independence. But how did we
get from independence on paper to independence in practice? It
has not been a smooth ride and several times in our history there
have been significant challenges to the independence of the fed-
eral courts.
III. SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES TO THE JUDICIARY'S
INDEPENDENCE
A. Political Conflict Between the Federalists and the Republicans15
The first of these confrontations occurred very early in the
nineteenth century, shortly after Thomas Jefferson's Republican
party had succeeded in seizing control of both the Presidency and
the Congress from the Federalists as a result of the election of
1800. Historians have called it the "second American Revolution,"
in which the Republicans led by Jefferson and Madison captured
both the executive and legislative branches of the federal gov-
ernment from the Federalists who had controlled them during the
first twelve years of the new nation.
The Federalists were determined to strike one last blow at
their Republican enemies before losing control of the executive
and legislative branches on March 4, 1801; John Adams remained
President until then, and the lame duck Congress was controlled
by Federalists. This Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801,16
which in calmer times would have been judged to be a significant
measure of judicial reform. It abolished the circuit-riding duties
of the Supreme Court Justices, and created sixteen new circuit
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
15. For further discussion regarding the marked conflict between the Federalists and
the Republicans subsequent to the presidential election of 1800, see WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE
AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 49-54 (1992) [hereinafter GRAND INQUESTS].
16. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
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judges and a number of new justices of the peace.17 But seen from
the perspective of the incoming Republicans, it was a transparent
Federalist patronage scheme. It was said that John Adams stayed
up until midnight in his last days in office signing commissions to
the new judicial positions, and these judges were henceforth re-
ferred to as the "Midnight Judges."
When the Republicans came into power in March, 1801, they
set about to undo the work of the lame duck Federalists, and re-
pealed the Judiciary Act of 1801. But the actions of the Federal-
ists continued to rankle; shortly after his election, Jefferson, in a
private letter written in 1801, described the Federalists in these
words: "On their part they have retired into the Judiciary as a
stronghold. There the remains of federalism are to be preserved
and fed from the treasury, and from that battery all the works of
republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.""8
1. The Impeachment of Judge John Pickering19
Since the Constitution provided for the removal of federal
judges only by the process of impeachment, the Republicans
looked around for a suitable target and settled on John Pickering,
a mentally deranged and frequently intoxicated federal district
judge in New Hampshire. There was no question that Pickering
was a disgrace to the judiciary and should have resigned; but
were mental derangement and chronic intoxication "high crimes
and misdemeanors" as provided in the Constitution?
In March, 1803, the House of Representatives impeached
Pickering, and almost exactly a year later, the Senate voted to
convict him and remove him from office. The Senate vote on
Pickering's impeachment did not augur well for the independence
of the judiciary; the vote in the Senate was strictly along party
lines, with all of the Republicans voting "guilty" and all of the
Federalists voting "not guilty."
17. Id.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Dec. 19, 1801), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903-04).
19. For further discussion concerning the impeachment of Judge John Pickering, see
GRAND INQUESTS, supra note 15, at 127-28.
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2. The Impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase21
The very day that the Senate voted to convict Pickering, the
House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment against
Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court of the United States.
This second impeachment proceeding was portentous with conse-
quences. Chase was one of six members of the Supreme Court, a
Federalist appointed to that position by President George Wash-
ington in 1796. If Chase were to be removed by the same party
line vote as Pickering was, the federal judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court of the United States, would almost certainly
be relegated to junior status among the three branches of the fed-
eral government with no real independence at all.
As a young Maryland lawyer and politician, Chase fit the Anti-
Federalist profile in his opposition to the ratification of the new
federal constitution. By the time of his appointment to the Su-
preme Court, however, he had become a staunch Federalist. He
presided over two controversial trials in 1800. When Jefferson
heard in May, 1803, of a charge which Justice Samuel Chase had
given to a grand jury in Baltimore denouncing some of the Repub-
lican politics, he was quick to write to Joseph Nicholson, one of
the Republican leaders in the House of Representatives:
Ought this seditious and official attack on the principles of our Con-
stitution, and on the proceedings of a State, to go unpunished? and
to whom so pointedly as yourself will the public look for the neces-
sary measures? I ask these questions for Nour consideration, for my-
self it is better that I should not interfere.
The House of Representatives first investigated possible
charges against Chase, and then voted to impeach him. The arti-
cles of impeachment included not merely Chase's charge to the
Baltimore grand jury, but also charges that he had shown a high
degree of partiality in presiding over the trial of John Fries in
Philadelphia, and of James Callender in Richmond, during the
year 1800.
20. For further information regarding the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, see
GRAND INQUESTS, supra note 15; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 269-73
(new ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT).
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph H. Nicholson (May 13, 1803), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 390 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903-04).
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Fries had been the leader of an uprising called Fries' Rebellion,
in which farmers in northeastern Pennsylvania had risen up
against federal tax assessors and prevented them from carrying
out their duties. Today Fries would probably be charged with ob-
struction of justice, but at that time he was charged with treason,
tried before Chase, and sentenced to hang. John Adams, to his
great credit, and against the unanimous advice of his cabinet,
pardoned Fries.
Here in Richmond, James Thomson Callender was tried under
the hated Sedition Act of 1798,22 which was aimed at repressing
political opposition. Callender, a well-educated Scotsman, notori-
ous hack writer, and great drinker, was indicted for publishing a
book entitled The Prospect Before Us,23 in which it was said that
he brought President Adams into disrepute by accusing him of be-
ing a monarchist and a toady to British interests. Callender was
fined $200 and sentenced to nine months in the Richmond jail for
libel. As it turned out, Callender later met with an unhappy end-
ing-not because of his writing though; he drank too much whis-
key before taking his daily bath in the river and was drowned.
When Samuel Chase's trial before the Senate opened on Feb-
ruary 4, 1805, in the new capital of Washington, D.C., interest
naturally focused on the principals in the forthcoming drama.
The Vice President of the United States and presiding officer of
the Senate was Aaron Burr. Burr was a dapper man with pierc-
ing black eyes. Even as he sat as the presiding officer of the im-
peachment court, he himself was a fugitive from justice. During
the preceding summer in Weehawken, New Jersey, Burr had
killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel. Indictments against him for
murder in New Jersey and a lesser offense in New York were out-
standing, leading one wag to remark that although in most courts
the murderer was arraigned before the judge, in this court the
judge was arraigned before the murderer!
It had been left to Aaron Burr as the presiding officer of the
Senate to outfit the chambers in a manner befitting the occasion,
and Burr spared nothing to accomplish this objective. On each
side of the President's chair at one end of the chamber were two
22. The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
23. JAMES THOMSON CALLENDER, THE PROSPECT BEFORE US (Richmond, Jones for
Pleasants and Field 1801).
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rows of benches with desks entirely covered with crimson cloth.
Here would sit the thirty-four Senators who would pass judgment
on Chase: two for each of the thirteen original states, and two
each from Vermont, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio. All of this
was done to recreate, as nearly as possible on this side of the At-
lantic Ocean, the appearance of the House of Lords at the time of
the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings in England at the end
of the eighteenth century.
Samuel Chase, who stood to lose his office as an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States if convicted by the
Senate, was more than six feet tall and correspondingly broad;
his complexion was brownish-red, earning him the nickname "Old
Bacon Face." He was hearty, gruff, and sarcastic; one would
rather have him as a dinner companion than as a judge in one's
case.
Chase had enjoyed a distinguished and successful career at the
bar, and in 1791 became Chief Judge of the Maryland General
Court. In 1796, George Washington appointed him to the Su-
preme Court of the United States. His legal ability was recog-
nized by all, but his impetuous nature made him something of a
stormy petrel. Joseph Story described Chase as the "living image"
of Samuel Johnson, "[iun person, in manners, in unwieldy
strength, in severity of reproof, in real tenderness of heart; and
above all in intellect."24 One of the federal district judges, with
whom Chase sat had a more negative reaction: "Of all others, I
like the least to be coupled with him. I never sat with him with-
out pain, as he was forever getting into some intemperate and
unnecessary squabble. If I am to be immolated, let it be with
some other victim or for my own sins."25
Chase's principal counsel defending him against the charges
brought by the House of Representatives was his long-time
friend, Luther Martin. Martin was one of the great lawyers in
American history, and also one of the great iconoclasts of the
American bar. He was the first Attorney General of Maryland,
24. Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P. P. Fay (Feb. 25, 1808), in 1 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 168 (William W. Story ed., 1851), reprinted in 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 465 (1922).
25. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 281 & n.1
(1922) (quoting Letter from Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering (1804), in XXVII THE
TIMOTHY PICKERING PAPERS 46 (Frederick Scouller & Roy Partolomei eds., 1966)).
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and served in that office for more than twenty years. He was a
member of the Continental Congress and a member of the Consti-
tutional Convention, and was for a while a state judge in Mary-
land. Like James Callender, he had a marked weakness for the
bottle, but at least in the short run intoxication did not seem to
impair his performance in court. He was described by the Ameri-
can historian Henry Adams as "the rollicking, witty, audacious
Attorney-General of Maryland;... drunken, generous, slovenly,
grand; bull-dog of Federalism ... the notorious reprobate gen-
)726ius.
The last of the rarae aves in the cast of characters which as-
sembled for the trial of Samuel Chase was the principal manager
for the House of Representatives, John Randolph of Roanoke. He
had been elected to Congress from his Virginia district while still
in his twenties, and became in effect the administration's leader
in the House of Representatives after the Republican victory of
1800. William Plumer described Randolph, not yet thirty-two at
the time of the Chase trial, as "a pale, meagre, ghostly man" who
had "the appearance of a beardless boy more than of a full grown-
man [sic]." 27 The ultimate southern tobacco planter, he patrolled
the House of Representatives in boots and spurs with a whip in
hand.
The presentation of evidence before the Senate took ten full
days, and more than fifty witnesses testified. The charges against
Chase with respect to the trial of John Fries for treason did not,
judged from the perspective of history, amount to much. The
charges against him in connection with the trial of James Callen-
der were a mishmash in which minor claims of error were mixed
together with serious charges of bias and partisanship. In Chase's
charge to the Baltimore grand jury, he had criticized the repeal of
the Judiciary Act of 1801, and also criticized pending amend-
ments to the Maryland Constitution which would have granted
universal male suffrage without any property qualifications.
The closing arguments to the Senate began on February 20,
and in the oral tradition of that time, lasted several days. On
March 1, the Senate convened to vote on the counts against
26. HENRY ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 141 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1883).
27. 1 WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE: 1773-1833, at 175-76
(Octagon Books 1970) (1922) (quoting LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 249 (A.P. Peabody ed., Da
Capo Press 1969)).
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Chase; Senator Uriah Tracy of Connecticut was brought into the
chamber on a stretcher in order to cast his vote.
Since the names of the Senators were called individually on
each of the eight counts, the roll call took some time. At this time
there were twenty-five Republicans and nine Federalists in the
Senate, and it was clear that if the Senators voted along party
lines the necessary two-thirds vote to convict Chase could be had.
The first roll call was on the charges growing out of the Fries
trial, and on this count the vote was sixteen to convict, and eight-
een to acquit. All nine Federalist Senators voted to acquit, and
they were joined by nine of the twenty-five Republicans. On the
next series of counts, growing out of the Callender Trial, there
was a majority of eighteen to sixteen to convict, but the two-
thirds rule was, of course, not satisfied. The final vote was on the
charge to the Baltimore grand jury, and on this count the manag-
ers came the closest to success: nineteen Senators voted to con-
vict, and fifteen voted to acquit, but still not a two-thirds major-
ity.
After the roll call, the Vice President rose and recited the votes
on each count, and then recited the portentous words, "It, there-
fore, becomes my duty to declare that Samuel Chase, Esquire,
stands acquitted of all the Articles exhibited by the House of Rep-
resentatives against him."2"
The significance of the outcome of the Chase trial cannot be
overstated-Chase's narrow escape from conviction in the Senate
exemplified how close the development of an independent judici-
ary came to being stultified. Although the Republicans had ex-
pounded grandiose theories about impeachment being a method
by which the judiciary could be brought into line with prevailing
political views, the case against Chase was tried on a basis of spe-
cific allegations of judicial misconduct. Nearly every act charged
against him had been performed in the discharge of his judicial
office. His behavior during the Callender trial was a good deal
worse than most historians seem to realize, and the refusal of six
of the Republican Senators to vote to convict even on this count
surely cannot have been intended to condone Chase's acts. In-
stead it represented a judgment that impeachment should not be
used to remove a judge for conduct in the exercise of his judicial
28. GRAND INQUESTS, supra note 15, at 105.
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duties. The political precedent set by Chase's acquittal has gov-
erned that day to this: a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a
basis for impeachment.
B. Ex Parte McCardle:29 Congressional Power to Define the
Supreme Court's Jurisdiction Absolute"
The second time in American history in which the independ-
ence of the Supreme Court was challenged occurred shortly after
the Civil War. Four years before the Civil War, at a time when
both North and South were greatly agitated about issues concern-
ing slavery, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the
ill-starred Dred Scott case.3 ' There, it held that Congress had no
authority to prevent slaveholders from taking slaves into the ter-
ritories.32
This was the second time in its history that the Supreme Court
had held an act of Congress unconstitutional; the first, of course,
was Marbury v. Madison,33 in which John Marshall established
the principle of judicial review. 34 But the act of Congress invali-
dated in Marbury in 1803 was one which nobody except a very
few lawyers knew or cared about; it dealt with the authority of
the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus.3 ' The act of Con-
gress held unconstitutional in the Dred Scott decision was the so-
called Missouri Compromise,36 which had prohibited slavery in
what were then the territories of the United States.37 People
cared a great deal about this question-it was very much in the
public mind at the time the decision came down-and most people
in the North were outraged by the decision. It was rightly re-
ferred to by a later Chief Justice as a "self-inflicted wound" from
which it took the Court at least a generation to recover. When the
29. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
30. For an in-depth analysis of the events leading up to McCardle and discussion re-
garding the McCardle ruling, see THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 270-73.
31. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32. Id. at 452.
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (i803).
34. Id. at 177-80.
35. Id. at 173-80.
36. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, repealed by Act. of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10
Stat. 277, 283, 289.
37. Id. § 8, 3 Stat. at 548.
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North was victorious in the Civil War, and the new Republican
party gained control of both Houses of Congress, the radical wing
of the party did not look kindly upon the Court.
The radical Republicans enacted a series of statutes known as
the Reconstruction Acts,3" which divided the previously seceded
states of the South into military districts with military governors
who had authority to override state legislation.39 The traditional
trial by jury was replaced with trial before a military commission
for a long list of offenses that were thought to threaten the "re-
construction" of the southern states.4" Many observers thought
that major parts of these laws contained serious constitutional
flaws.
In 1867, a newspaper editor in the southern state of Missis-
sippi, William H. McCardle, used his publication to criticize re-
construction, as well as the military officers administering it
throughout the South. His vituperative editorials understandably
landed him in hot water with the military. McCardle was ar-
rested and charged with several crimes, including inciting insur-
rection and printing libelous statements, and was held for trial by
a military tribunal. McCardle sought habeas corpus in the federal
circuit court in Mississippi, claiming that his arrest and detention
contravened the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The circuit court decided against McCardle, and, under the law
as it then existed, he had an appeal as a matter of right to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which he promptly took.
Rumors abounded that the Supreme Court would use the
McCardle41 case to declare the Reconstruction Acts unconstitu-
tional, and there is substantial evidence that sentiment on the
38. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; Act. of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2.
39. See id.
40. §§ 3-4, 14 Stat. at 428-29.
41. The Court published two opinions in this case, which often leads to much confu-
sion. The first, Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868), upheld the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction over the actions of inferior courts by habeas corpus. The second, Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction be-
cause Congress, in 1868, revoked the Act of 1867 which had given the Court jurisdiction in
this case. The Court noted that "[tihe act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction
any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867." Id. at 515. Additionally,
it should be noted that these cases were heard in the December terms of 1867 and 1868,
respectively. However, the decisions were not handed down until the following year. Thus,
they are often erroneously cited as 1867 and 1868, but should be cited as 1868 and 1869.
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Court favored such an outcome.42 But, early in March 1868, as the
case was being argued before the Supreme Court and submitted
for decision, Congress swiftly repealed the very legislation which
gave the Court jurisdiction over the case. That repeal bill became
law on March 27, 1868. Although the McCardle case had come up
for decision at conference six days earlier on March 21, the Court
had postponed decision because of the pending repeal legislation.
The Court then adjourned on April 6, and ordered the McCardle
case to be put over until the next term without any decision.
In an attempt to force the Court to act, attorneys for McCardle
asked that the effect of the repeal legislation on the case be ar-
gued before the Court.43 This request was granted.44 When the
Court finally issued its opinion the following year in April 1869, it
unanimously upheld the repeal measure and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction." In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase (no relation to Samuel Chase), the Court held
that Article III of the Constitution gave power to Congress to
make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
and the Court could not inquire into the Congressional motive
behind the legislation.46
The prestige of the Supreme Court obviously did not fare well
during its encounters with the Reconstruction Congress. Un-
doubtedly, it could have ruled differently in the McCardle case,
but it may be that the Court's apparent decision to live to fight
another day was the best conceivable one under the circum-
stances.
C. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Attempt to Reorganize
the Supreme Court47
Some sixty years had elapsed between the acquittal of Samuel
Chase in 1805 and the decision in the McCardle case in 1869.
42. See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 465 (1971).
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id.
45. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514-15.
46. Id. at 514.
47. For further discussion regarding President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, see
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 116-33.
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Nearly seventy more years would elapse before the time of the
third incident in American history when the independence of the
Supreme Court was again threatened, this time by the President.
In 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was beginning his
second term in the White House by virtue of an overwhelming elec-
toral victory in 1936 in which he won the electoral vote in all but
two states of the Union. The Supreme Court was not an issue in
that Presidential election, but the Court was apparently very much
on President Roosevelt's mind because of certain cases the Court
had decided during Roosevelt's first term as President.
In fact, during President Roosevelt's initial term, the Supreme
Court had declared unconstitutional the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act,48 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,49 and the so-called "Hot
Oil Act"50-one of the centerpieces of his New Deal program to lift
the country out of the Great Depression. The Court had also ruled
against the government in several minor cases."'
Confronted with this series of defeats, President Roosevelt de-
cided to take action. In his view, the Court had become a road-
block to the progressive reforms needed in the nation. Just as
President Jefferson had in 1801 trained his sights on the Federal-
ist members of the Supreme Court, Roosevelt planned to use his
immense political resources to bring the Court into step with the
President and Congress. In February 1937, Roosevelt summoned
the members of his cabinet and the Democratic leadership of both
Houses of Congress to an unusual meeting at the White House.
There Roosevelt unveiled the message he planned to send to Con-
gress that day, recommending that the Judicial Branch of the
government be "reorganized." The message proposed that for each
member of the Supreme Court who was over seventy years of
age and did not elect to retire-six of the nine members of the
Court were in that situation-the President would be empowered
48. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring
the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power).
49. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (declaring the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), an unconstitutional invasion of the power reserved by the
States).
50. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933), an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power).
51. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Constan-
tine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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to appoint an additional Justice to the Court, thereby enlarging
the Court's membership to a total of fifteen. The true reason for
the plan, of course, was to enable the President to "pack" the
Court all at once, in such a way that New Deal social legislation
would no longer be threatened. But President Roosevelt based his
public argument on the duplicitous premise that the older judges
were unable to carry a full share of the Court's workload and that
the Court was falling behind in its work. This reason was demon-
strably false.
The proposal astounded the Democratic leadership in Congress
and the nation as a whole. Political observers thought that Roose-
velt would undoubtedly get what he wanted. The Democrats had a
four-to-one margin in the House of Representatives, and of the
ninety-six members of the Senate, only sixteen were Republicans.
The Chief Justice at that time was Charles Evans Hughes.
Hughes and the Associate Justices of the Court were offered free
broadcast time by the radio networks to speak about the President's
plan, which Roosevelt insisted on calling a "reorganization" plan
while opponents dubbed it a "Court-packing plan." The Justices
wisely declined these offers and said nothing. But Chief Justice
Hughes worked busily .behind the scenes with Senator Burton
Wheeler of Montana, a Democrat who agreed to lead the opposition
to the bill.
Chief Justice Hughes wrote a letter to Senator Wheeler, using
very telling statistics to show that the Supreme Court was entirely
abreast of its workload and could not possibly decide cases any
faster than it was doing. This letter, presented to the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, demolished the original justification for the bill
and caused President Roosevelt to switch to a franker justifica-
tion-the Supreme Court as presently constituted was frustrating
the popular will by invalidating needed social legislation.
The battle in the Senate lasted from March until July 1937. One
event after another damaged the plan's chances for enactment.
That spring, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions which
upheld, by the narrow vote of five-to-four, important pieces of Roo-
sevelt's social legislation.52 This was thereafter known as "the
52. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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switch in time that saved nine."53 Next, one of the oldest and most
conservative members of the Court, Willis Van Devanter, retired,
giving the President the opportunity to appoint a new member of
the Court without the need for the Court-packing plan. Eventually,
public opinion began to rally against Roosevelt's proposal.
Debate in the Senate on the bill began in early July, in the midst
of one of the worst heat waves in Washington, D.C. history. A few
days after the debate began, the Democratic majority leader and
floor leader for the bill, Senator Joe Robinson of Arkansas, was
found dead one morning in his apartment. The Senate recessed in
order to allow Senators to take the train to Little Rock for Robin-
son's funeral.
President Roosevelt realized he did not have the votes to pass the
bill in the Senate, and he agreed on a face-saving solution by which
the bill, rather than being defeated in a floor vote, would be recom-
mitted with a tacit understanding that the provisions relating to
the Supreme Court would be deleted. Supporters of the Court-
packing plan hoped to effectuate this compromise by using such
vague language that the casual observer would not realize what
was happening. They had almost succeeded when Senator Hiram
Johnson, a maverick Republican from the State of California who
had opposed President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, asked
whether the portion dealing with the Supreme Court was dead. At
first the floor leader tried to shunt his question aside, but the
white-haired Californian persisted.
"The Supreme Court is out of the way?" inquired Senator John-
son.
"The Supreme Court is out of the way," acknowledged Senator
Logan.
Hiram Johnson then exclaimed, "Glory be to God!" and sat
down.54 After a momentary pause, as if by pre-arranged signal, the
spectators' galleries broke into applause-the President's Court-
packing plan was indeed dead.
53. FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393
(1933) ("Popular description of Justice Owen J. Roberts's changed position in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).").
54. THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 132.
[Vol. 38:579
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
President Roosevelt lost the Court-packing battle, but he won the
war for control of the Supreme Court. He won it not by any novel
legislation, but by serving in office for more than twelve years, and
appointing eight of the nine Justices of the Court. In this way the
Constitution provides for ultimate responsibility of the Court to the
political branches of government.5"
IV. CONCLUSION
Three times in America's history, a politically dominant major-
ity has challenged the authority and independence of the Su-
preme Court as an institution. In the 1805 case of Justice Samuel
Chase, the effort was to remove a member of the Court from office
because of the content of his rulings from the bench. In 1868, the
congressional leadership sought to strip the Court of its jurisdic-
tion to consider a particular case because those leaders thought
the Supreme Court would rule against the constitutionality of a
measure viewed by them as essential. And in 1937, the President
tried to enlarge the size of the Court so that he could immediately
place six of his own appointees on it and swing the ideological
balance from conservative to liberal.
These incidents are to some extent an outgrowth of the ten-
sions built into our three-branch system of government. To a very
significant degree these tensions are probably desirable and
healthy in maintaining a balance of power in our government. Ul-
timately, we have had the good fortune that through our system
of checks and balances the independence of our Supreme Court
and the federal judiciary has been preserved when such conflicts
have arisen. We have seen that this in large part is dependent
upon the public's respect for the judiciary. For it was the United
States Senate-a political body if there ever was one-who
stepped in and saved the independence of the judiciary, both in
the Chase trial in 1805 and in Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan in 1937.
I suspect the Court will continue to encounter challenges to its
independence and authority by the other branches of government
because of the design of our Constitutional system. The degree to
which that independence will be preserved will depend again in
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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some measure on the public's respect for the judiciary. Maintain-
ing that respect and a reserve of public goodwill, without becom-
ing subservient to public opinion, remains a challenge to the fed-
eral judiciary.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
